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Copyright Infringement Litigation

and the Exercise of Personal
Jurisdiction Within Due Process
Limits: Judicial Application of
Purposeful Availment, Purposeful
Direction, or Purposeful Effects
Requirements to Finding that a
Plaintiff Has Established a
Defendant's Minimum Contacts
Within the Forum State
by Daniel E. Wanat*
I. INTRODUCTION
An action for an infringement of a copyright secured under the United
States Copyright Act 1 may raise issues of copyright ownership, a
defendant's access to a plaintiff's work, and substantial similarities
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University (B.A., 1968; J.D., 1971); University of Illinois College of Law (LL.M., 1976).
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Memphis Foundation in support of the research and writing of this Article. The Author
also wishes to acknowledge the work of Ms. Anna Richardson, his research assistant,
during the editing of this Article.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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between a plaintiff's work and a defendant's work.2 When raised, the
issues bear on the merits of a plaintiff's copyright claim against a
defendant.3
Suppose, however, that a copyright owner brought suit in the forum
state against a nonresident defendant.4 The defendant's first defense
may be based on the state's lack of personal jurisdiction.5 This defense

2. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
a plaintiff must prove ownership of the copyright and the defendant's copying of protected
elements of copyrighted work, which, absent direct evidence, is shown through circumstances of access and substantial similarity).
3. Id. Section 501 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides for a copyright owner's action
against an infringer of the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 501.
4. This Article analyzes issues of the exercise of personal jurisdiction within copyright
litigation in the nonresident defendant, non-in-state personal service context only. As an
important aside, however, the state in which a civil suit was brought historically could
secure jurisdiction over a defendant's person through service of process while the defendant
was present within the state. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (holding that the
defendant's presence within the court's territorial jurisdiction is a prerequisite to the entry
of a valid judgment).
A defendant's presence, plus proper in-state service, continues to result in a proper
jurisdictional exercise. Id. In Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), four
United States Supreme Court Justices affirmed the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a
presence-plus-service case. Id. at 628. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court states that
"the Due Process Clause does not prohibit the California courts from exercising jurisdiction
over petitioner based on the fact of in-state service of process." Id.
Justice White, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, wrote:
The rule allowing jurisdiction to be obtained over a nonresident by personal
service in the forum State, without more, has been and is so widely accepted
throughout this country that I could not possibly strike it down, either on its face
or as applied in this case, on the ground that it denies due process of law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (White, J., concurring).
Justice White also recognized that the Court could strike down this rule but was
unprepared to do so because "there has been no showing here or elsewhere that as a
general proposition the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many
instances that it should be held violative of due process in every case." Id.
It is noteworthy that Justice Brennan, with whom three Justices joined, concurred in the
Burnham Court's judgment and stated: "[Tihe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment generally permits a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if he
is served with process while voluntarily present in the forum State." Id. at 628-29
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, however, refused to conclude that presenceplus-service "'has been immemorially the actual law of the land.'" Id. at 629 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,528 (1884)). Justice
Brennan, therefore, would examine the fairness of the forum state's presence-plus-service
rule. Id. at 629-40.
5. Infra notes 81-171 and accompanying text (analyzing United States Courts of
Appeals and district court caselaw). It must be noted that federal courts have exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction over an action for copyright infringement. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
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implicates issues under the forum state's law and the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment.'
Resolution of the due process issue begins within the United States
Supreme Court opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington7 and
continues with that case's progeny.'
In general, when deciding if
jurisdiction exists within due process limits, the Supreme Court asks
whether a defendant's act purposefully establishes minimum contacts
within the forum state.9
Among the considerations of the minimum contacts inquiry, indeed
touchstones of this due process question, are the following: (1) whether
the defendant acted with a purpose to avail himself or herself of the
benefits and protections of the forum so that the defendant may expect
to be haled into court there; (2) whether the defendant acted purposeful-

(2000). Although the action must be brought before a United States district court, no
statute of the United States Code provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an
infringer-defendant.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), however, provides:
"Service of a summons ... is effective to establish jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant ... who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction
in the state in which the district court is located." FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Under Rule
4, a district court must refer to the law of the state where it is sitting to resolve this
personal jurisdiction problem. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). If the copyright infringement
defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the forum state's court, the defendant is also
within the personal jurisdiction of the federal court. Precision Craft Log Structures, Inc.
v. Cabin Kit Co., No. CV05.199-S-EJL, 2006 WL 538819, at *2 (D. Idaho Mar. 3, 2006)
(finding that a copyright infringement defendant must meet Idaho's statutory requirements
concerning personal jurisdiction). The jurisdictional exercise under state law is valid,
however, only if it complies with due process. Id. at *3. For the discussion of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and the United States Supreme Court cases
dealing with due process limits, see infra notes 18-79 and accompanying text.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Because an action for copyright infringement is one to which
the federal question subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts applies, the due process
rights of the alleged infringer-defendant arise under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 17:140 (2006). For what
it is worth, because personal jurisdiction necessarily concerns a civil suit against a
defendant within the territorial boundaries of a state, perhaps the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution is implicated as well. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. No cases
found address the issue. The federal copyright cases analyzed within this Article make no
distinction between Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process limits.
Infra notes 81-171 and accompanying text.
7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. Infra notes 18-79 and accompanying text.
9. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (holding that "it is essential...
that ... the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws"); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that an individual
purposefully avails himself or herself of the benefits and protections of a state's laws when
his conduct is "such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there").
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ly, expressly aiming at causing effects (in other words, directing them)
within the forum state; and (3) whether the defendant's purposeful
availment, or aimed acts, caused harmful effects within the forum
state. 10
If the plaintiff is unable to show prima facie that the defendant's acts
resulted in forum state purposeful availment, direction, or effects, the
plaintiff's copyright infringement action will be dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction.1 1
Thereafter, the plaintiff is left to find a
constitutionally permissible forum state in which to bring the infringement suit.12
This Article examines copyright infringement cases in which federal
courts have applied the jurisdictional due process concepts of purposeful
availment, purposeful direction, and purposeful effects. 13 Part III
contains a general analysis of the copyright infringement and purposeful
availment, direction, and effects case law.14 In Parts IV and V, two
areas within the existing case law are treated discreetly. The first is
purposeful availment, direction, and effects jurisprudence of federal
courts within the Ninth Circuit. 5 The second is a passive versus
interactive analysis that federal courts apply to resolve purposeful
availment, direction, or effects issues in copyright infringement cases
concerning the Internet. 6

10. For a discussion of United Supreme Court decisions from Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958), through Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), see infra notes 27-58 and
accompanying text.
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). The case law governing a copyright plaintiffs burden of
proof on the personal jurisdiction issue indicates that a plaintiff must show prima facie
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant satisfies due process limits.
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Cameron, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1144-45 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The prima
facie proof rule allows a plaintiff to establish the propriety of the jurisdictional exercise
without the need for a trial.
12. Goldberg, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1144-45.
13. In this regard, the question whether the defendant has purposefully availed himself
or herself of the forum state arises in cases where that state may have specific jurisdiction
rather than general jurisdiction over the defendant. The substance of each basis for
personal jurisdiction emerged from the opinion in InternationalShoe. Infra notes 23-26
and accompanying text (considering the defendant's activities unrelated to the plaintiffs
cause of action as well as activities from which the action arose).
14. Infra notes 80-171 and accompanying text. Two authors argue for a unified test of
personal jurisdiction applicable to all cases. C. Douglas Floyd & Shima BaradaranRobison, Toward a Unified Test of Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused
Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601 (2006) (rejecting purpose

or intent as flawed and favoring objectively foreseeable expectations).
15. The jurisdictional analysis of the federal courts of appeals provides a model for
lower federal courts to follow. Infra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
16. Infra notes 204-34 and accompanying text.
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Finally, in Part VI of the Article, the Author makes conclusions and
comments on the state of the purposeful availment, direction, and effects
requirements in copyright infringement litigation. 17 Before exploring
the relevant copyright infringement caselaw, Part II provides a primer
of the purposeful availment, purposeful direction, and purposeful effects
tests within due process limits by briefly visiting the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, beginning with InternationalShoe.
II.

AN

OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

JURISPRUDENCE: PERSONAL JURISDICTION; DUE PROCESS LIMITS;
AND PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT, PURPOSEFUL DIRECTION,
OR PURPOSEFUL EFFECTS

A.

InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington

In copyright litigation, when a federal court considers dismissing an
infringement action for lack of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, its analysis begins with the Supreme Court's decision in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington."s In the Court's opinion, written
by Chief Justice Stone, the question addressed was "whether, within the
limitations of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .. ,
a Delaware corporation ... has by its activities in the [sitate of
Washington rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the courts of that
state."' 9
In analyzing the due process issue, the Court acknowledged that,
historically, a defendant's "presence within the territorial jurisdiction of
[a] court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally
binding him."2" Presence as a necessary condition to personal jurisdiction, however, was discarded by the Court in InternationalShoe when
Justice Stone added:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such

17. Infra notes 235-64 and accompanying text.
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). It is noteworthy that a copyright is an intangible right. 3
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[C] (2007). It has
no situs, as such, apart from its owner. Id. When the owner of a copyright brings an
infringement action, personal jurisdiction must be exercised over the defendant. Id.
19. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311. The suit against the corporation was brought under a
Washington statute that required employers to contribute to a state unemployment
compensation fund. Id.
20. Id. at 316 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)).
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that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditionalnotions of
fair play and substantialjustice.2 '
Following the decision in International Shoe, presence within the
forum state no longer marked due process limits. Rather, a court
exercising jurisdiction over a defendant in personam may do so if the
defendant's contacts with the forum state require that the defendant
defend a suit there.2 2 When elaborating on its contacts framework, the
Court emphasized those contacts that were "systematic and continuous."23 According to the Court, these contacts "justify suit ... on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities."24
The Court also recognized that a defendant exercising the "privilege"
The Court added, in
of acting within a state may incur obligations.2
substance, that so far as the defendant's obligations arise out of or are
connected with its activities within the state, the defendant may be
required to respond to the suit initiated to enforce those obligations.2 s
B.

Hanson v. Denckla

Thirteen years after the Court adopted the minimum contacts
approach in InternationalShoe, it returned to that subject in Hanson v.
Denckla.2 " In Hanson the issue was whether a Florida court erred in
holding that the nonresident defendants were subject to personal
jurisdiction.2"
When considering this issue, Chief Justice Warren wrote that although
"progress in communications and transportation has made the defense
of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome..., a defendant may not

21. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 320.
24. Id. at 318. The Supreme Court, subsequent to International Shoe, continued to
refine this jurisdictional basis, referring to it in short hand fashion as "general jurisdiction." See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.9 (1984).
25. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
26. Id. The Supreme Court, subsequent to InternationalShoe, continued to refine this
jurisdictional basis, characterizing it as "specific jurisdiction." See Helicopteros, 466 U.S.
at 414 n.8 (citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 BARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144-64 (1966)). In addition, the Court's "instate activities" language hints at the notion that the defendant's acts through which she
purposefully avails herself of the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum state
justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a suit arising from or connected to those acts.
See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.

27. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
28. Id. at 243. The forum state's jurisdictional exercise was challenged under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 245; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with
that [s]tate that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him."29
When it considered those contacts, the Court made clear that "[tihe
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
[s]tate."

°

Rather, "it is essential . . . that there be some act by which

the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum [s]tate, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws."31
The Court in Hanson recognized that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction within due process limits required a finding that the
defendant acted with a purpose to avail himself or herself of the forum
state.3 2 The Court applied and refined Hanson on a number of
occasions. The first of significance was World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson.3 3

29. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251. The Court in Hanson affirmed the rule in International
Shoe, less burdensome circumstances notwithstanding. Supra note 21 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's announcement of minimum contacts as a basis for a
constitutionally sound personal jurisdiction exercise in InternationalShoe).
30. 357 U.S. at 253.
31. Id. (emphasis added). The distinction that the Court made between the unilateral
activity of a person other than a nonresident defendant and the activity of a nonresident
who "purposefully avails itself" of a state's benefits is fundamental to the Court's
jurisdictional analysis. Id. In this regard, the forum may be the "center of gravity" for
choice of law purposes or may be the "most convenient location for litigation," but neither
alone nor both together are enough for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. Id. at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. at 253. As a historical note, Justice Black, with whom two Justices joined,
wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 256-62 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black opined that
the exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional, notwithstanding the absence of the
nonresident defendant's acts that constitute purposeful availment of the forum state's
benefits. Id.
33. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). It is worth noting that before the Court decided World-Wide,
it affirmed Hanson's purposeful availment rule in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216
(1977). The Court in Shaffer did so in conclusory fashion because the nonresident
defendants over whom jurisdiction was sought "simply had nothing to do with" the forum
state. Id. Beyond that conclusion, the Court's opinion in Shaffer adds nothing to the
purposeful availment discussion.
It is worth noting, however, that Justice Brennan, in his dissent, foresaw developments
in the application of the purposeful availment requirement that took place in subsequent
decisions of the Court. Id. at 219-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In this regard, Justice Brennan's opinion addressed the fairness to nonresident
defendants of subjecting them to suit in the forum state: "The fact that the record does not
reveal whether they 'set foot' or committed 'act[s] related to [the] cause of action' in [the
forum state] is not decisive, for jurisdiction can be based strictly on out-of-state acts having
foreseeable effects in the forum [sitate." Id. at 226 (first and second brackets in original).
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C. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
World-Wide, a Volkswagen distributor, and Seaway, a Volkswagen
retail seller, were both sued in Oklahoma, although neither did business
in that state, nor did either "ship[] or sell[] any products to or in that
[s]tate." 4 When the Court applied the principles of InternationalShoe
and Hanson, it determined that neither the distributor nor the dealer
availed itself "of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law."35
The Court also distinguished between circumstances that would show
a nonresident defendant availed itself of the forum and those in which
the defendant foresaw its product's use in the forum state.36 According
to the Court, "that a product will find its way into the forum [sitate" is
not "the foreseeability that is critical to due process ....

Rather, it is

that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum [sitate are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there." 37
The Court added that a nonresident defendant "has clear notice that
it is subject to suit there" when it "'purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum [sltate."'35 For the

Essential to Justice Brennan's analysis was the nonresident defendants' volitional
association with the forum that reflected an election "to assume powers and to undertake
responsibilities wholly derived from that [s]tate's rules and regulations, and to become
eligible for those benefits that [forum] law makes available." Id. at 228. For a discussion
of what the future held for Justice Brennan's position, see infra notes 74-78 and
accompanying text.
34. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 289. The factual recitation concluded with the concession
that "there was no showing that any automobile sold by [the distributor or seller] has ever
entered Oklahoma with the single exception of the vehicle involved in the present case."
Id. The action was one of products liability brought against the automobile's distributor
and its retailer arising from an accident that occurred in Oklahoma. Id. at 288.
35. Id. at 295.
36. Id. The respondents (the plaintiffs to the tort action who commenced suit in
Oklahoma) argued that "because an automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose,"
World-Wide and Seaway foresaw an Oklahoma injury. Id.
37. Id. at 297.
38. Id. (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). In World-Wide had the distributor or the
dealer-petitioners sold the subject vehicle in an effort, either directly or indirectly, to serve
the Oklahoma market, both could be sued in that state. Id. at 298. In this regard, the
Court's opinion suggested that an effort to serve a market within the forum state is
manifested when the defendant "delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum [sitate." Id. It is
noteworthy that Justice Brennan, in his dissent, concluded that "[t]he sale of an automobile
does purposefully inject the vehicle into the stream of interstate commerce so that it can
travel to distant [sitates." Id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Ultimately, the Court held
that the jurisdictional exercise in Oklahoma did not satisfy due process limits. Id. at 299
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Court, the result on the jurisdictional issue in World-Wide was clear
because evidence on the purposeful availment requirement demonstrated
that the jurisdictional exercise violated the nonresident defendants' due
process rights.39
After World-Wide, the Court continued to focus on a nonresident
defendant's purpose in conducting activities connected to the forum
state.40 However, the Court expanded that purpose from one in which
the defendant purposefully availed himself or herself of the forum state's
benefits to one in which the defendant purposefully aimed or directed his
or her activities toward the forum state.41 This distinction surfaced
before the Court in two cases, both decided on the same day in 1984.42
D. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine
In the first case, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,43 the Court concluded
that the court of appeals erred in holding that there was a lack of
personal jurisdiction." In doing so, the Court quoted, with approval,
the district court's findings.4" According to the district court, Hustler
Magazine, the nonresident defendant, had "purposefully directed" the
circulation of its magazines to New Hampshire, the forum state.4 6 As
a result, the district court found that it was "unquestionable that New
Hampshire jurisdiction over a complaint based on those contacts would
ordinarily satisfy the requirement of the Due Process Clause."47
The Supreme Court in Hustler did not use the phrase "purposefully
directed" to characterize the reason for the constitutionality of the

(majority opinion).
The United States Supreme Court, subsequent to World-Wide, examined the relationship
of commerce and expectation to purposeful availment resulting in an evenly divided court
in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Infra notes 67-78 and
accompanying text (discussing the opinions of Justices O'Connor and Brennan in Asahi).
39. Five Justices reached this result. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 299. Separate
dissents were authored by three Justices, with Justice Blackman joining in Justice
Marshall's dissent. Id. at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984).
41. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774; Calder,465 U.S. at 789-90.
42. Keeton, 465 U.S. 770; Calder, 465 U.S. 783.
43. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
44. Id. at 772. Interestingly, the forum state, New Hampshire, was the only state in
which the plaintiffs claim of libel, the basis of her suit, was not time-barred by a statute
of limitations. Id. at 773.
45. Id. at 773-74.
46. Id. at 774.
47. Id. The requirement to which the district court referred was minimum contacts.
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forum's jurisdictional exercise.4 8 That concept was expressed by the
Court when it stated: "Where.. . Hustler Magazine, Inc., has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it must
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there in a libel action based
on the contents of its magazine." 9
E.

Calder v. Jones

The second decision in which the Supreme Court expanded the
jurisdictional reach of the forum state over a nonresident defendant was
Calder v.Jones.5 ° In this case concerning a suit in California against
a Florida resident, the Court examined the defendants' minimum
contacts with California.5 1 In doing so, the Court focused on "'the
52
relationship among the defendant[s], the forum, and the litigation."'
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that
"California [was] the focal point both of the story and of the harm
suffered. Jurisdiction [was] therefore proper in California based on the
'effects' of. . . Florida conduct in California. " 3 When answering the
defendants' arguments that the California effects were merely foreseeable and the jurisdictional exercise was violative of their due process
rights, the Court responded: "[The defendants] are not charged with
mere untargeted negligence. Rather, their intentional, and allegedly
tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California.""' The Court
concluded that when these criteria were met, the defendants could

48. Id. at 781.
49. Id. The nonresident defendant's continuous and deliberate exploitation of the
market for its magazine in the forum state was not different in substance from that
defendant's purposefully directing the circulation of its magazine in the forum. See id. at
774, 781. It also is worth noting that the Supreme Court recognized that Hustler
Magazine's business in New Hampshire would "support jurisdiction when the cause of
action arises out of the very activity being conducted, in part, in New Hampshire." Id. at
780. "[But the] activities in the forum may not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction
over a cause of action unrelated to those activities." Id. at 779.
50. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
51. Id. at 785-86.
52. Id. at 788 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204).
53. Id. at 789 (emphasis added). The story was alleged to have libeled actress Shirley
Jones (the mom of "The Partridge Family" and the Gary, Indiana librarian in the movie
version of "The Music Man") and concerned her activities in California as a California
resident. The defendant-author and defendant-editor were Florida residents who
researched and wrote the story in Florida and disseminated it from that state into
California. Id. at 785-88.
54. Id. at 789 (emphasis added). Telling is the court's determination that when the
article was authored and edited, both of the defendants 'knew [it] would have a potentially
devastating impact" on its target, the California resident, given the publication's large
circulation in that state. Id. at 789-90.
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"'reasonably anticipate being haled into court"' in California
to answer
55
the allegations that they committed an intentional tort.
In Calder the Court expanded the reach of due process by including
within its scope the following: (1) the effects of nonforum state conduct
in the forum state and (2) the effects of nonforum state activities that
are intentional, tortious, and expressly aimed at the forum.5" Those
analyses are encapsulated by phrases such as "purposeful effects" and
"purposeful direction."5 7
From Hanson through Keeton and Calder, the Supreme Court wrote
with approval of "purposeful availment," "purposeful effects," and
"purposeful direction" as tests of a forum state's jurisdictional exercise
that satisfied due process." The Court continued its analysis of these
threshold requirements in two additional cases-Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz 9 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.6 °
F

Burger King Corp. v.Rudzewicz

The opinion in Burger King embodies a synthesis of the Court's earlier
caselaw. First, in deciding whether a nonresident defendant has
"purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum [s]tate,6 1
the Court defined the defendant's relevant acts as those through which
the defendant "'purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum [sitate, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.'"82 Second, the Court held that a court may
exercise "jurisdiction over a nonresident [defendant] who 'purposefully

55. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297).
56. See Calder, 465 U.S. 783.
57. See id.; see also infra notes 172-203 and accompanying text (analyzing United
States district court decisions within the Ninth Circuit).
58. Additional due process considerations may preclude the jurisdiction's exercise under
InternationalShoe's "minimum contacts" approach. These due process boundaries are
beyond the scope of this Article. They are discussed in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985) (holding that the defendant's burden of litigating in the forum,
the forum's interest in the litigation, the plaintiffs interest in convenience and an effective
remedy, and judicial efficiency, among other things, may be considered).
Due process limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction are the subjects of a number
of excellent treatises. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §§ 17:133-17:193
(2006); JACK J. FRIEDENTUAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§§ 3.10-3.13 (4th ed. 2005); LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE ch.
3, §§ A-H (2004); FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE §§ 2.3-2.9 (5th ed. 2001).
59. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
60. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
61. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
62. Id. (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
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directs' his activities toward forum residents."6 3 The Supreme Court
also noted that it has "consistently rejected the notion that an absence
of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction" within the forum
state. 64
The Court's decision in BurgerKing remains important. Within it, the
Court continued to accept the purposeful availment test of minimum
contacts.' In addition, the Court's opinion reflected its approval of the
purposeful direction test.66 One decision is left for examination.

G. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
67
An examination of Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
completes this overview and synthesis of the Supreme Court decisions
addressing the relationship between personal jurisdiction and purposefully-established minimum contacts. Part II.A. of Justice O'Connor's
opinion, which the Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia
joined, is significant in this case.'
In Part II.A., Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the touchstone of
whether a jurisdictional exercise falls within due process limits
"'remain[ed] whether the defendant purposefully established 'minimum
contacts' in the forum [s]tate.'"69 That touchstone, in turn, is satisfied

63. Id. at 473. One reason for this conclusion is the state's "'manifest interest' in
providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-ofstate actors." Id. It should be kept in mind that the forum state's interest also exists when
a resident injury results from the defendant's out-of-state act. Here, effects in the forum
state, if purposeful, would establish minimum contacts. Id.; see also supra notes 50-57 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's 'effects" test from Calder).
The Court offered a second reason, namely, that when persons purposefully derive a
benefit from interstate activity, "it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to
account in other [sitates for consequences that arise proximately from such activities." Id.
at 474. A nonresident defendant's volition or purpose and the benefit received in the forum
state appear essential to this rationale for the purposeful direction test. Given this reason,
the nonresident's act necessary for a state to exercise jurisdiction is apparently commercial
in nature. Such was the case in Burger King. Id. at 480.
64. 471 U.S. at 476. The converse, however, is not true, at least if the contacts cause
forum state effects. Supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
"effects" test from Calder).
65. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
66. See id. at 472-73.
67. 480 U.S. 102 (1985).
68. Id. at 105. Although the Court was unanimous in holding that jurisdiction could
not be founded upon an overseas sale in which the defendants were aware that some of
their products would find their way into the forum state, the Court was divided evenly on
the reasons for this result. Id.
69. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474). As an aside, Justice O'Connor
and the three Justices who agreed with her returned to the Court's roots: the seminal
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when the defendant acts to purposefully avail himself or herself of the
forum state, "'thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'"7 °
According to Justice O'Connor, the touchstone is also satisfied when a
nonresident defendant's acts are "purposefully directed at the forum
[s]tate."7
Justice O'Connor's opinion made clear that minimum
contacts are conditioned on the defendant's acting with a purpose related
to the forum state.72 Her opinion, therefore, followed the line of
Supreme Court cases from Hanson through Burger King that focused on
the defendant's acts, the defendant's purposes, and the relationship of
both to the forum state.73
Justice Brennan, joined by three other Justices, was opposed to Justice
O'Connor's premise and reasoning in Part II.A. of her opinion.74
Justice Brennan's premise was that if the defendant foresaw that its
product would be swept into the forum, through the stream of commerce,
then that foreseeability established "minimum contacts."75 According
to Justice Brennan, the stream of commerce is not "unpredictable
currents or eddies, but [is] ... the regular and anticipated flow of
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale." 76 Thus,
according to Justice Brennan, the nonresident's purposeful activity was
unnecessary to establish minimum contacts because he benefitted
economically from a sale within the forum and from the forum state's
"laws that regulate[d] and facilitate[d] commercial activity."77 Justice
Brennan's jurisdictional premise and reasoning was that of foreseeability

decision in InternationalShoe. Id. at 113-14.
70. Id. at 109 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475).
71. Id. at 110. The four Justices joining in Part II.A. of the opinion rejected the
position that "mere foreseeability or awareness was a constitutionally sufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction if the defendant's product made its way into the forum [sitate while
still in the stream of commerce." Id. at 111. The Justices reasoned that placing a product
into the stream of commerce is not equivalent to an act purposefully directed at the forum.
Id. at 112. With respect to determining what conduct manifests an act purposefully
directed at the forum, Justice O'Connor's opinion contained the following examples: (1) a
product's design intended for the forum state market, (2) forum state advertising, (3)
"establishing channels for providing regular advice" to forum consumers, and (4) marketing
through a distributor serving as the defendant's forum sales agent. Id.
72. Id. at 112.
73. The effects test of Calder should be included within this mix of defendant's acts
that are purposefully related to the forum state. Indeed, the test is applicable to copyright
infringement cases. Infra notes 172-203 and accompanying text (discussing decisions of
federal courts within the Ninth Circuit).
74. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
75. Id. at 116-17.
76. Id. at 117.
77. Id.
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through the stream of commerce, not an act with 7a purpose in relation
to the forum state, as it was for Justice O'Connor. 8
With Justice O'Connor's and Justice Brennan's opinions in Asahi
discussed, this primer of InternationalShoe and its progeny is at an end.
This Article now turns to the decisions of a number of federal courts of
appeal and district courts in copyright infringement cases. These federal
court opinions contain analysis of the jurisdictional teachings of the
Supreme Court. Generally, the areas of interest are those of a nonresident defendant's act with a purpose to avail, to direct, or to cause effects
within the forum state. 9
III. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS AND PERSONAL
JURISDICTION: ACTING WITH A PURPOSE TO AVAIL ONESELF OF THE
FORUM STATE; ACTING WITH A PURPOSE TO DIRECT EFFECTS WITHIN
THE FORUM STATE; OR ACTING WITH A PURPOSE TO AND CAUSING
EFFECTS WITHIN THE FORUM STATE-THE CASELAW80
A.

Illustrative United States Courts of Appeals Decisions

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the
Fifth Circuit have considered the relationship between a copyright
infringement action and the constitutionally permissible exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant of the forum state.
The position of the Sixth Circuit is found in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Still N the Water Publishing. l
1. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publishing. In
Bridgeport Music, Bridgeport brought copyright infringement actions in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee,
alleging infringement of a number of sound recordings and musical

78. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit accepted Justice Brennan's
foreseeability through the stream-of-commerce premise and reasoning within the copyright
litigation setting. Infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
79. Because federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over copyright
infringement cases, this examination of personal jurisdiction within the limits of due
process involves only those courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (vesting in federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction in copyright infringement cases); see also supra note 5 (discussing the
relationship between the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction over a copyright
infringement claim and personal jurisdiction over a defendant-infringer).
80. As a reminder, the personal jurisdiction decisions of federal courts within the Ninth
Circuit involving copyright infringement have been set aside for separate treatment, along
with the decisions of federal courts in Internet cases. Infra notes 172-234 and
accompanying text.
81. 327 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
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compositions through "sampling."12 The actions were brought against
two music publishing companies; one was a Texas resident," and the
other was a Florida resident.84 Bridgeport claimed that both defendants distributed the allegedly infringing copies in Tennessee.85
On the defendants' motions, the district court dismissed the claims
against each defendant because the court lacked personal jurisdiction.8 6
On Bridgeport's appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered "whether exercising
personal jurisdiction over [the Texas and Florida defendants was]
consistent with federal due process requirements."'
When it analyzed the propriety of the jurisdictional exercise, the court
in Bridgeport Music recognized that the threshold inquiry was whether
"the defendant ... purposefully avail[ed] himself of the privilege of
acting in the forum state or caus[ed] a consequence in the forum
state." 8 Thereafter, the court elaborated on the meaning of purposeful
availment8 9 The following factors were important: (1) the defendant's
"'deliberate undertaking to do or cause an act or thing to be done in [the

82. Id. at 474. The court of appeals noted that "'sampling' is the process of copying
portions of prior master sound recordings directly onto new sound recordings and then
rapping on top of the new sound recording." Id. at 475 n.2. In addition, the court noted
that the samples in this case were "used in rap records" and contained elements of the
musical compositions or the sound recordings, or both that were at issue in the case. Id.
83. Id. at 476. N-the-Water Publishing, Inc. ("NTW") was a music publishing company
"with its principal place of business in Texas." Id. In addition to Bridgeport's allegations
of sampling against NTW, it claimed infringements through the licensing of the infringing
works and the distribution of them. Id.
84. Id. The defendant, DM Records, Inc. ("DM"), was an independent record company.
Bridgeport alleged that, in addition to sampling, DM infringed Bridgeport's copyright on
some music and sound recordings when it distributed them both. Id. The United States
Copyright Act grants to a copyright owner the exclusive right to distribute or authorize the
distribution of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).
85. BridgeportMusic, 327 F.3d at 476.
86. Id. at 477.
87. Id. To be valid, a federal court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant in a federal question case, such as copyright infringement, must (1) come within
the terms of the "long-arm" statute of the state in which the court is sitting and (2) accord
the defendant due process under the Fifth Amendment. Id. The court in BridgeportMusic
faced only the due process issue. Id. In this regard, the Tennessee long-arm statute
provides that courts in Tennessee can assert jurisdiction "on 'any basis not inconsistent
with the constitution of this state or of the United States.'" Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-214(a)(6) (1994 & Supp. 2007)). The statute's language has been construed to be
"coterminous with" federal due process limits. Payne v. Motorists' Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d
452, 455 (6th Cir. 1993). Tennessee's long-arm statute's application is examined in
LAWRENCE A. PIVNICK, TENNESSEE CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE §§ 4:3-4:5 (Thompson West
2007).
88. Bridgeport Music, 327 F.3d at 477.
89. Id. at 478-79.
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forum state]'";9" (2) the defendant's creation of a "'substantial connection' with the forum [s]tate";91 and (3) the defendant's "'overt actions
connecting [him] with the forum state.' ' 92 The court concluded that
when the plaintiff showed "purposeful availment, the absence of physical
contacts with the forum state [would] not defeat personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant."93
In addition to the court's description of purposeful availment, the court
expressed its preference for, and analyzed the constitutionality of, the
jurisdictional exercise under the premise adopted by Justice O'Connor
in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.94 The court in Bridgeport Music characterized Justice O'Connor's view of personal jurisdiction
as "stream-of-commerce-plus," with the "plus" being the defendant's
purposeful availment of the forum state's benefits.95
Having adopted Justice O'Connor's approach, the court in Bridgeport
Music also considered whether the plaintiff made a prima facie showing
of purposeful availment.9" It did so first with respect to the Texas
defendant, N-the-Water Publishing, Inc. ("NTW"). 97
In this regard, the following activities were important: (1) licensing of
the allegedly infringing musical compositions to a record company for
90. Id. at 478 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Neogen
Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 891 (6th Cir. 2002)).
91. Id. (quoting CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996)).
92. Id. (quoting Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134 F.3d 1269, 1274 (6th Cir. 1998)).
In its explanation of the purposeful availment requirement, the court of appeals considered
the issue of whether the jurisdictional exercise was reasonably foreseeable versus one
based on "'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts" or on the "'unilateral activity' of
another." Id. at 478 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 463, 475 (1985));

see also supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing the purposefulness
consideration in Burger King).
93. Bridgeport Music, 327 F.3d at 479. It is worth recalling that the United States
Supreme Court, when deciding InternationalShoe, eschewed physical presence alone as a
jurisdictional basis for minimum contacts. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
94. 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Bridgeport Music, 327 F.3d at 479-80. For the discussion of
Justice O'Connor's Asahi analysis, see supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. By
implication, it appears the Court in Bridgeport rejected the premise put forth by Justice
Brennan and the Justices who joined in his opinion. BridgeportMusic, 327 F.3d at 479-80.
For a discussion of Justice Brennan's opinion, see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying
text. Finally, the Sixth Circuit applied a purposeful availment test rather than focusing
on the reasonableness and fairness of the exercise of personal jurisdiction alone, as was
done in Asahi by Justice Stevens with two Justices joining. BridgeportMusic, 327 F.3d at
479-80; see Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that the exercise
of jurisdiction may be unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional even though the
defendant acted purposefully with respect to the forum state).
95.
96.

Bridgeport Music, 327 F.3d at 480.
Id.

97. Id. at 480-81.
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marketing of recordings nationwide; (2) nationally advertising and
marketing the allegedly infringing musical compositions; (3) affiliating
with two performing rights societies-Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI") and
the Association of Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP"); and
(4) selling the compositions at issue through the Internet.95
With respect to nationwide licensing of the musical compositions, the
court in Bridgeport Music held that NTW's knowledge that its licensee
"was likely to distribute NTWs compositions nationally, coupled with
[NTW's] lack of objection to Tennessee sales, if such sales were ever to
occur, [was] insufficient conduct upon which to predicate purposeful
availment."99
The court reached a similar result with respect to
distribution and sale in Tennessee via the license. 0 0 According to the
court, "[T]hese contacts [were] too random, fortuitous, and attenuated for
a finding of purposeful availment." 10 1
Bridgeport fared no better when the court examined NTW's advertising and marketing activities." 2 In this regard, the plaintiff argued
that there was national advertising through "television and radio spots,
and in ... magazines.' '3 The court of appeals acknowledged that
advertising reached out to residents of the forum state, but determined
there was a lack of "evidence of advertising directly targeting or even
actually reaching Tennessee."' °4

98. Id. at 480-83.
99. Id. at 480. The court of appeals suggested that had the nationwide licensing
agreement required Tennessee sales, the result would have been different. See id. In this
regard, 'required sales" provided the purposeful element, not awareness of likely marketing
within the forum state alone. Id.
100. Id. at 480-81.
101. Id. at 481. The court added that NTW took no action "to direct the compositions
to Tennessee." Id. at 480. Had NTW done so, Bridgeport's distribution and sale in the
forum state would have provided a basis for finding purposeful availment. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id. In its deposition, NTW's CEO stated: .'[w]e attempt to market nationally.'"
Id. (brackets in original).
104. Id. Had there been evidence sufficient to demonstrate that advertising reached
Tennessee, the result need not have been that the copyright infringer purposefully availed
itself of that forum state. Id. at 481 n.10. Within footnote ten of the case, the court took
no position on these facts, but cited to three circuits in which the United States Courts of
Appeals held national advertising alone insufficient to manifest purposeful availment. Id.
(citing SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1997); Federated Rural Elec. Ins.
Corp. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 1994); Singletary v. B.R.X.,
Inc., 828 F.2d 1135, 1136 (5th Cir. 1987)). None of the noted cases arose in the copyright
infringement context. It is submitted that a like result would be reached in a copyright
case absent the alleged infringer's deliberate effort to induce forum residents to acquire or
use the infringing copies. The court in BridgeportMusic suggested as much. Id.
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As to NTW's affiliations with BMI and ASCAP, the court held for the
defendant."0 5 Although the relationships had a Tennessee connection,
the court of appeals held that the nexus did not result in purposeful
availment.'0 ° Rather, the court opined that evidence must be offered
showing that a performing rights society had an "affirmative duty to
license or market the subject compositions specifically in Tennessee."0 7
NTW offered no evidence of purposeful availment of the forum state,
Tennessee. 10 8 As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal on lack of jurisdiction grounds.'0 9 The court of
appeals then turned its attention to the Florida defendant, DM Records,
Inc. ("DM").110
The court held that DM had purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of acting in Tennessee."' Specifically, DM entered into a distribution
agreement in which its distributor was obligated to distribute the
allegedly infringing recordings in Tennessee as well as the other fortynine states. 1 2 The result was that once DM benefited from the
distributor's fulfillment of its obligation to distribute the recordings, DM
had purposefully availed itself of the Tennessee forum."'
Given prima facie evidence of purposeful availment, the court in
Bridgeport Music reversed the district court's dismissal with respect to
the defendant, DM." 4 The case, however, was remanded so the

105. Id. at 483.
106. Id. at 482-83.
107. Id. at 482. The Sixth Circuit also held that NTW's Internet sale of the infringing
songs was not prima facie evidence of purposeful availment. Id. at 483. In this regard, the
court indicated that evidence of a "sufficiently interactive" website was necessary to satisfy
this requirement. Id.; see also infra notes 204-34 and accompanying text (discussing the
special manner in which purposeful availment intersects with copyright infringement and
the Internet context).
108. BridgeportMusic, 327 F.3d at 483.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 484.
112. Id. Of significance to the court was Bridgeport's evidence demonstrating that
DM's president understood that the contract required distribution "'in all 50 states.'" Id.
113. Id. The opinion also indicated that through its website, DM purposefully availed
itself of Tennessee's benefits. Id. In this regard, the website's users could "access DM's
catalog and purchase DM's records." Id. Bridgeport's evidence showed thirty-six of two
"allegedly infringing albums" were sold through the website. Id.; see also infra notes 20434 and accompanying text (Part V and the special manner in which purposeful availment
intersects with copyright infringement and the Internet).
114. Bridgeport Music, 327 F.3d at 485.
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district court could consider jurisdictional matters in addition to
purposeful availment." 5
2. Luv N' Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc. The Fifth Circuit had
occasion to apply the purposeful availment requirement to a copyright
infringement case in Luv N' Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc. 116 The
decision in Luv N' Care, however, was strikingly different from that of
the Sixth Circuit in BridgeportMusic.
In Luv N' Care, the court of appeals rejected the rule that "placing a
product into the stream of commerce,. . .where the defendant knows the
product will ultimately reach the forum state, does not rise to the level
of 'purposeful availment."'1 7 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit declined to
follow Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi."8'
The purposeful availment test adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Luv N'
Care follows: "'mere foreseeability or awareness [is] a constitutionally
sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction if the defendant's product made
19
its way into the forum state while still in the stream of commerce.''

115. Id. Significantly, the absence of the defendant's purpose to avail itself of the
forum state's benefits results in a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, but its presence may
remove only that jurisdictional obstacle. For example, in BridgeportMusic, the following
questions remained in the case: (1) whether DM's acts by which it purposefully availed
itself of the forum gave rise to the cause of action and (2) whether the exercise of
jurisdiction over DM was reasonable. As to both issues, the court of appeals recognized the
need for factual analysis not present in the record on appeal. Id.
116. 438 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2006).
117. Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
118. Id. Judge DeMoss specially concurred. Id. at 474 (DeMoss, J., specially
concurring). Although he joined his colleagues on the three-judge panel in the result,
Judge DeMoss wrote separately, applying Justice O'Connor's stream-of-commerce-plus
premise. Id. at 474-75. This Article analyzes Judge DeMoss's opinion following the
discussion of the two judges who rejected the O'Connor approach. Infra notes 125-30 and
accompanying text. For an examination of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, see supra
notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
119. 438 F.3d at 470 (brackets in original) (quoting Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v.
Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993)). Prior to Luv N' Care, decisions of the Fifth
Circuit in the products liability context adopted the "mere foreseeability" approach to
resolving the personal jurisdiction question. See Ruston, 9 F.3d at 419; Bean Dredging
Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1984). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also adopted the theory within the products liability
context. Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that the
defendants knew they were sending the subject product into the stream of commerce
toward the forum). Stream of commerce was also the constitutional premise that Justice
Brennan advocated in Asahi. Supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
In Luv N' Care, the court of appeals concluded that the circuit adopted this test to
remain faithful to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Luv N' Care, 438 F.3d at 470. The
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Having adopted a stream-of-commerce premise, the court in Luv N' Care
turned to the purposeful availment test's application against InstaMix. ' Thus, the court needed to determine whether there had been
an act through which Insta-Mix "'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities [in Louisiana], thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.'"12"
After considering the acts of Insta-Mix, the court held the following:
(1) the defendant's allegedly infringing bottle (the cap's design) entered
the forum state, Louisiana, as a result of purchase orders that Insta-Mix
filled and confirmed with its distributor-retailer; (2) Insta-Mix's sales
invoices indicated that the bottle as designed would reach Louisiana; (3)
"Insta-Mix derived substantial revenue (about 4.5% of its total distribution) from its sale of thousands of units" of the bottle at issue within the
forum state; and (4) Insta-Mix's contract with its distributor-retailer,
through which it sought to shift title to the allegedly infringing
materials before they left Insta-Mix's home state, did
not preclude the
122
forum state, Louisiana, from exercising jurisdiction.

defendant's expectation that forum state consumers would buy its product, at the time of
placing the product into the stream of commerce, was essential to a proper jurisdictional
exercise. Id. (citing World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 298). However, also resting at the heart of
World-Wide's holding was whether a consumer would buy only if the defendant acted with
a purpose to avail itself of, or to direct effects toward, the forum state. Supra notes 36-39
and accompanying text.
120. Luv N' Care, 438 F.3d at 469-72. That claim was brought originally before a
United States district court sitting in Louisiana. Luv N' Care was based in that state.
Insta-Mix was a Colorado corporation. Id. at 468-69. Insta-Mix's alleged infringement
concerned "[tihe design of the straw cap" of its plastic bottle that was similar to the design
of Luv N' Care's bottle cap. Id. at 468. As an important aside, original sculptural features
of a useful article such as a bottle cap may be the subject matter of a copyright. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). These sections provide that the
definition of a sculptural work may be the subject matter of a copyright. See id.
121. Luv N' Care, 438 F.3d at 469-70 (first brackets in original) (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). The judges in Luv N' Care decided to go back to the
original Supreme Court case that gave rise to the purposeful availment analysis. Id. (citing
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.)
122. Id. at 471. When it considered whether to sustain the jurisdictional exercise, the
court in Luv N'carebalanced a contract term against the considerations enumerated in the
text above. Id. These considerations, or the "quantity and regularity" with which InstaMix directed shipments of the infringing bottle into Louisiana, outweighed its attempt
through the contract term to avoid jurisdiction in that state. Id. It appears that, on
balance, when acts of a nonresident defendant are purposefully directed toward the forum
state, they will prima facie outweigh that defendant's efforts via a contract to avoid
jurisdiction within the forum state. If a defendant desires to avoid suit within the forum
by contract, it may be able do so in the following manner: "forbid" the distributor-retailer
from selling within the forum state. Id. at 472 n.13.
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According to the court of appeals, Insta-Mix acted with a purpose to
avail itself of Louisiana for the distribution and sale of the capped
bottles that allegedly infringed Luv N' Care's design. 123 As such, the
court held the defendant had "'minimum contacts"' with Louisiana.12 4
Judge DeMoss, a member of the judicial panel that decided Luv N'
Care,was obligated under existing Fifth Circuit precedent to concur with
his colleagues' use of the stream-of-commerce premise to answer whether
Insta-Mix had made minimum contacts with the forum state. 1 5 Judge
DeMoss, nevertheless, wrote a separate opinion in which he demonstrated the difference between a stream-of-commerce-based analysis and
Justice O'Connor's analytical framework in Asahi, stream-of-commerceplus. 126

In this regard, Judge DeMoss pointed out that Insta-Mix did not
design and designate the bottle "for the Louisiana market." 127 The
128
Judge added that "Insta-Mix did not advertise in Louisiana."
Moreover, the alleged infringer established no channels for providing
regular advice to customers in the forum, nor did it market the product
through a distributor or sales agent in that state. 2 9 The absence of
these elements, which are essential to both Justice O'Connor's stream-ofcommerce-plus analysis and the purposeful availment test, led Judge
DeMoss to conclude that the federal district court in Louisiana lacked
jurisdiction over Insta-Mix in the copyright infringement action.13 °
The decisions of the Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport Music and the Fifth
Circuit in Luv N' Care are vivid illustrations of different results on the
personal jurisdiction issue in copyright infringement cases. Although
both courts applied a purposeful availment test for establishing
minimum contacts, the court in Bridgeport Music did so from a streamof-commerce-plus premise, while the court in Luv N' Care did so from a

123. Id. at 472.
124. Id. Ultimately, the court in Luv N' Care reversed the dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction in Louisiana over Insta-Mix. Id. at 474.
125. Id. at 474 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring).
126. Id. at 474-76.
127. Id. at 475.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Judge DeMoss was mostly concerned with the adverse consequences to state
sovereignty and federalism when courts adopt a stream-of-commerce premise for deciding
constitutional personal jurisdiction issues. Id. at 476. He urged the Supreme Court to
take up this matter "and resolve it and the increasing circuit divide with clarity." Id. To
date the Court has not done so. In fact, as recently as 2005 the Supreme Court declined
to do so. Diversified Telecom Servs., Inc. v. Clevinger, 683 N.W.2d 338 (Neb. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1050 (2005).
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stream-of-commerce premise only."' In addition to decisions of the
United States Courts of Appeals, several opinions of federal district
courts illuminate the application of the purposeful availment requirement to a copyright infringement action against a nonresident defendant.
B. Copyright Infringement Actions-United States District Courts
Apply the Purposeful Availment, Direction,and Effects Tests
1. KnowledgeAZ, Inc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc. In KnowledgeAZ, Inc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc. ,132 the plaintiff brought an
infringement action in Indiana, the plaintiff's principal place of business,
against the defendant, Jim Walter Resources, Inc. ("JWR"), an Alabama
corporation, and others.'" The plaintiff claimed that JWR infringed
its copyright on some computer software, which violated the parties'
unauthorized copies of
licensing agreement by "making and retaining
134
[the plaintiff's] eWarehouse software."

JWR moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. 135
When ruling upon the motion, the district court acknowledged that "due
process require[d] that [JWR] must have established contacts with the
forum state by purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting
business there." 36
The court then decided whether there were contacts rising to the level
of purposeful availment." 7 In this regard, the court made two signifi131. Bridgeport, 327 F.3d 472; Luv N' Care, 438 F.3d 465. The results indicate that
absent stream-of-commerce-plus considerations, a defendant that is an alleged copyright
infringer may more readily be subject to forum state jurisdiction than a defendant whose
acts must measure up to those considerations, notwithstanding the application of the
purposeful-availment test in both cases. Judge DeMoss's specially concurring opinion in
Luv N' Care demonstrates as much. Supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
132. 452 F. Supp. 2d 882 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
133. Id. at 887.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 892. As a preliminary matter, the district court's opinion provided its
readers with a reminder. Id. Although federal question jurisdiction exists under the
copyright law, "[tihe Copyright Act does not provide for nationwide service of process, so
personal jurisdiction is governed by the law of the forum state, Indiana." Id.; see also
supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)).
According to the court in KnowledgeAZ, under Indiana law, courts of the "'state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitutions of this state or
the United States.'" 452 F. Supp. 2d at 872 (quoting IND. TRIAL P. R. 4.4A). Indiana's rule
narrowed the plaintiffs proof to a showing that the jurisdictional exercise was within
federal due process limits. Id.
136. KnowledgeAZ, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
137. Id.
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cant points at the outset of its analysis: (1) a nonresident of the forum
who contracts with a forum resident does not necessarily establish a
minimum forum contact and (2) the entirety of the transaction must be
examined, including the negotiations, consequences, terms, and actual
course of dealing.'38
After examining the entire relationship between the plaintiff and
JWR, the district court found it to be continuous in nature and, most
importantly, one that JWR "deliberately entered into" with the plaintiff,
an Indiana corporation. 3 9 The court concluded the deliberate conduct
was such that JWR "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting business in Indiana."4 °
Thereafter, the district 4 court
denied JVR's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.1 1
2. Barrow Industries, Inc. v. JST America, Inc.
A second
illustrative district court opinion applying purposeful-based tests is
Barrow Industries, Inc. v. JST America, Inc.1 42 In this case, Barrow,
a fabric designer, brought a copyright infringement action before a
federal district court sitting in Massachusetts against JST, a fabric
designer, alleging that JST's fabric design, "Classique Persian," infringed
upon its "M 4760" copyrighted design. 143 Because the suit was brought
in a Massachusetts district court, JST, a Florida corporation, made a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 4 4 When considering JST's motion, the district court examined whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction would offend due process.'
The focus of that

138. Id. at 896.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 899.
142. No. 01-11619, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7490, at *1 (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2002).
143. Id. at *3-4.
144. Id. at *1. The parties' arguments and the district court's analysis of them address
a number of issues other than whether JST purposefully availed itself of the forum,
Massachusetts. One part of this discussion is worthy of note. The Massachusetts long-arm
statute provided, in effect, that before a court could exercise personal jurisdiction over JST,
it would have had to cause a "tortious injury" in the state. Id. at *17. The statute limited
the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction in the copyright infringement case to
a tortious injury within the forum. Id. Barrow, therefore, had the burden to make a prima
facie showing of such an in-state injury. Id. Absent the injury, the court could dispose of
the jurisdictional motion as a matter of Massachusetts statutory law. Id. The court in
Barrow found that Barrow did not meet its statutory burden. Id. The court, nevertheless,
analyzed federal due process limits as well. Id. at *18-27.
145. Id. at *16-27. Under the existing precedent of the First Circuit, a court must
analyze the defendant's contacts, if any, to determine if the defendant "'purposefully
availed' [itself of] the benefits and protections" of the forum state. Id. at *16 (citing United
States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 620-21 (1st Cir. 2001)).
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examination was both the purposeful availment and the purposeful
direction requirements of the minimum contacts analysis. 4 ' According
to the court in Barrow, these jurisdictional limits compel a court to
distinguish between a defendant's "intent" concerning its forum contacts
and those contacts resulting from "happenstance." 47
Upon consideration of the distinctions, the court concluded that the
only contact to consider was JST's advertisement in a trade magazine,
one copy of which was in Barrow's hands in Massachusetts. 148 The
court indicated that the single contact was "happenstance," not
"intended," because "nothing in that advertisement [bore] any of the
hallmarks suggesting that JST was targeting Massachusetts' consumers." 4 s The result was that Barrow had not satisfied the purposeful
direction requirement of due process. 5 °
The federal district courts in both KnowledgeAZ and Barrow shared
a common conclusion with respect to the due process tests of purposeful
availment and purposeful direction. Namely, to apply either, the
defendant's forum contacts must be intentional or deliberate in nature.
The intended or deliberate contact elements of both purposeful availment
and purposeful direction were taken a significant step further in Dakcoll
Inc. v. Grand Central Graphics, Inc.'' The court in Dakcoll did so by
applying them in copyright litigation to the effects test of minimum
52
contacts sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones.1
3. Dakcoll Inc. v. Grand Central Graphics, Inc. In Dakcoll the
plaintiff, a North Dakota corporation, owned valid copyrights in artwork
"consisting of designs and patterns used for embroidery purposes.
The defendants (the court referred to both as Grand Central Graphics)
were Minnesota corporations."' 4
In its complaint against Grand Central Graphics, the plaintiff claimed
an infringement of its artwork copyrights "'by copying, distributing,

146. Id. at *16-27.
147. Id. at *22 (emphasis omitted).
148. Id.
149. Id. at *22-23. The court was of the opinion that a defendant intended to
purposefully avail itself of the forum's privileges through a single magazine advertisement
generally circulated if that defendant targeted Massachusetts consumers (solicitation of
new customers through name recognition). Id. at *21 (citing Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue
Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 40-42, 44 (D. Mass. 1997)).
150. Id.at *22.
151. 352 F. Supp. 2d 990 (D.N.D. 2005).
152. Id. at 998; 465 U.S. 783 (1984). For the discussion of Calder, see supra notes 5057 and accompanying text.
153. 352 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
154. Id.
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marketing, and/or causing, facilitating, and otherwise contributing to the
copying, distributing, and marketing of [the plaintiff's] embroidery
designs.'"155 In response to the plaintiff's complaint, Grand Central
Graphics moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.15
In
analyzing the jurisdictional issue, the district court stated: "minimum
contacts require some act by which the defendant purposely avails
himself or herself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state."'57
When it applied the purposeful availment test to Grand Central
Graphics' acts, the district court found catalog distribution and sales of
the allegedly infringing designs in North Dakota. 5 1 According to the
court, the effects test from Calder was the applicable rule to that catalog
distribution and sale."5 ' Under that test, the forum state court must
examine the impact on or harm to the plaintiff in the forum that arose
from the defendant's actions intended to cause the effects within the
forum state. 160 When the court in Dakcoll considered the intended
effects within the forum state, it found that "there [was] evidence to
support the Plaintiff's assertion that Grand Central Graphics 'knowingly
and intentionally infringed on the [copyrights].'"1 6 '
The court reached this holding for a number of reasons: (1) the
plaintiff gave Grand Central Graphics "ample warning" of the alleged
infringement, yet Grand Central Graphics refused "to cease and desist";
(2) once Grand Central Graphics received the written warning, its acts
thereafter were knowing ones; (3) because the warning informed Grand
Central Graphics that the plaintiff was a North Dakota company, Grand

155. Id. The Copyright Act's exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution appear
at issue from the face of the plaintiff's complaint. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
To be held liable, a defendant to a copyright infringement action need not be the actual
infringer. A defendant who contributes to the infringement also establishes liability. See,
e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435-42 (1984)
(claiming the makers of videotape recorders contributed to infringement of copyrights by
users).
156. Dakcoll, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 993. North Dakota's long-arm statute has been
interpreted to authorize that state's "courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants to the fullest extent permitted by due process." Id. at 994 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Hansen v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 230 (N.D. 2002)). The court in
Dakcoll, therefore, recognized that the only jurisdictional issue before it was whether its
exercise would satisfy federal due process limits. Id.
157. Id. at 995.
158. Id. at 997.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 999 (second brackets in original) (quoting Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota
Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1391 (8th Cir. 1991)).
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Central Graphics "knew the brunt of the injury would be felt in North
Dakota"; (4) Grand Central Graphics distributed catalogs and allegedly
infringed embroidery designs in North Dakota; and (5) because the
plaintiff's warnings informed Grand Central Graphics that the plaintiff
would sue for copyright infringement, "Grand Central Graphics must
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in North Dakota."'62
According to the court in Dakcoll, the Calder effects test was satisfied
when the requisite intention was met, and Grand 6 3Central Graphics
purposely availed itself of the forum, North Dakota.
Having discussed Dakcoll and its effect on the analysis of acting with
a purpose to avail, direct, or effect, this Article's examination of those
due process minimum contacts limitations among federal courts is at an
end.6 In sum, Bridgeport Music and Luv N' Care demonstrated the
differences that United States Courts of Appeals took toward application
of the purposeful availment test pursuant to the opinion in Asahi.
If, as in Bridgeport Music, a federal court adopts Justice O'Connor's
stream-of-commerce-plus premise to purposeful availment, the plaintiff
makes its prima facie jurisdictional showing under the following
circumstances: (1) when the defendant acts with a purpose to avail
himself or herself of the forum state or (2) when the defendant acts with
the intention or aim of reaching forum residents.'6 5 On the other
hand, should a federal court accept Justice Brennan's stream-ofcommerce premise, as did the court in Luv N' Care, the defendant's
awareness that the infringing copies were marketed in the forum state
satisfies the purposeful availment requirement.'6 6 The distinction
between BridgeportMusic and Luv N' Care may be one determinative
of the jurisdictional issue.
For example, a defendant may be aware of the marketing of infringing
copies in a forum state, yet the defendant may not have acted deliberately to cause that marketing. In this event, under Bridgeport Music, the
plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing of purposeful availment.

162. Id.
163. Id. The district court found that the jurisdictional exercise over Grand Central
Graphics satisfied due process and did "not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Id. at 1000.
164. Interestingly, the court in Dakcoll viewed forum-state-intended effects as an
example of purposeful availment. Id. at 997-1000. It may be well for a court to recognize
that consideration of forum-state-intended "effects" stands independently of availment
when addressing the minimum contacts issue.
165. Supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing the stream-of-commerce-plus
analysis in Bridgeport Music).
166. Supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
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The result is that the case would be dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
IfLuv N' Care applies, the defendant's awareness or the foreseeability
of infringing copies being marketed within the forum state satisfies the
purposeful availment test. 167 After that
requirement has been met, the
16
plaintiff's case moves to other issues. 1
Given the diverse views of purposeful availment, the opinions of the
federal district courts sampled reflect distinctions made when applying
that requirement. In this regard, the hallmark of the caselaw is that the
defendant acts
with the intent to avail, direct, or cause effects in the
169
forum state.

With the decisional law among federal courts of appeals and district
courts in hand, this Article turns to the following: (1) application of the
purposeful availment, direction, or effects jurisprudence in copyright
infringement litigation within the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit 7 ° and (2) application of the purposeful availment,
direction, or effects
tests in copyright infringement litigation in the
17 1
Internet context.

IV. SPECIAL CASE ONE: PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT, PURPOSEFUL
DIRECTION, OR PURPOSEFUL EFFECTS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION

A number of federal district courts sitting in states within the Ninth
Circuit have developed a body of law in copyright infringement cases, in
which the purposeful availment, purposeful direction, or purposeful
effects requirements of minimum contacts were applied. 72 This

167. Judge DeMoss's specially concurring opinion in Luv N' Care also illustrates that
adopting stream-of-commerce-plus versus stream-of-commerce may lead to different results.
438 F.3d at 474-76 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring); supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
168. The failure to satisfy other due process jurisdictional requirements may support
a dismissal. Supra note 115 and accompanying text.
169. Supra notes 132-63 and accompanying text.
170. Infra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
171. Infra notes 204-34 and accompanying text.
172. Infra notes 174-203 and accompanying text. There also is an unreported opinion
of the Ninth Circuit arising from the copyright infringement setting. N. Coast Indus. v.
K-Mart Corp., No. 89-16179, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 21074 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1990). In that
case, the appeals court affirmed a dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction because the contact with
the forum state (shipment of the allegedly infringing material) resulted from conduct by
someone other than that of the defendant. Id. at *1. As a result, the contact was
"fortuitous and [was] due to the unilateral activity of a third party." Id.
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caselaw serves as a template for each requirement's
application that
173
other federal courts may desire to follow.

A.

Precision Craft Log Structures, Inc. v. Cabin Kit Co.
In Precision Craft Log Structures, Inc. v. Cabin Kit Co.,174 the
plaintiff ("Precision Craft"), an Idaho corporation, brought a copyright
infringement action against the defendant ("Cabin Kit"), a Nevada
corporation.1 75 Precision Craft alleged that Cabin Kit copied Precision
Craft's copyrighted architectural plans and log cabin models. 76
In response to Precision Craft's complaint, Cabin Kit filed a motion to
dismiss, contending that its contacts with Idaho, the forum state, were
"virtually non-existent" and that it did "nothing to 'purposefully direct'
its business activities to Idaho residents."177 In reply, Precision Craft
averred that Cabin Kit, by infringing Precision Craft's copyrighted plans
and models, committed
a tort in Idaho and therefore submitted to that
17
state's jurisdiction.

In reviewing Cabin Kit's motion and Precision Craft's response, the
district court acknowledged that the first question concerning the proper
exercise of jurisdiction was whether Cabin Kit acted purposefully within
Idaho.179 That condition, if proven, would assure Cabin Kit was not in
an Idaho court because of "random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or

173. Infra notes 174-203 and accompanying text. In general, the due process
limitations on personal jurisdiction issue are complicated by the evenly divided Supreme
Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. California,480 U.S. 102 (1987). Supra notes 67-78
and accompanying text. In the final analysis, it will take a clear message from the
Supreme Court before lower federal courts can settle the broad issue of the proper exercise
of personal jurisdiction within constitutional limits. Congress, however, may choose to
address the relationship between copyright infringement and personal jurisdiction. As of
the date of this Article, Congress has not done so.
174. No. CV05-199-S-EJL, 2006 WL 538819 (D. Idaho Mar. 3, 2006).
175. Id. at *1.
176. Id. Precision Craft mailed a cease and desist letter to Cabin Kit and offered it a
license to use Precision Craft's plans and models, but Cabin Kit refused the offer. Id.
177. Id. Cabin Kit had no business presence in Idaho, nor did it have employees there.
Id. In addition, "it ha[d] no dealers ... in Idaho, [did] not own real property in Idaho, and
[did] not maintain bank accounts in Idaho." Id.
178. Id. at *2. Under the Idaho long-arm statute, a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction "when a tortious act is committed within the state." Id. at *3 (citing IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 5-514 (2004)). This language was construed to extend the jurisdiction of
courts in Idaho to the due process limits of the United States Constitution. Id.
Consequently, the question remaining in Precision Craft was whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant was constitutional. Id.
179. Id. at *4.
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on account of the unilateral activity of third parties." 8 ' The court
added that sufficient assurance of an act's purposefulness existed if
Cabin Kit aimed or directed an act that had an effect on Precision Craft
in Idaho.'1'
When it examined whether Cabin Kit directed an act that caused an
effect in Idaho, the district court pointed to the following circumstances:
(1) Cabin Kit's knowledge that Precision Craft was an Idaho company;
(2) Cabin Kit's capacity to deliver and the actual delivery of its catalog
to Idaho customers; (3) Cabin Kit's sale of Precision Craft's copyrighted
plans and other materials to Idaho customers; (4) Cabin Kit's knowledge
that Precision Craft owned copyrights in the plans and drawings that
Cabin Kit reproduced and distributed; and (5) Cabin Kit's willful use of
Precision Craft's copyrighted works. 182 These allegations, in turn, led
the court to conclude that "Cabin Kit's conduct and connection with
Idaho were such that [it] should have reasonably anticipated being sued
13
in Idaho."1
In addition to PrecisionCraft, decisions of two other federal district
courts sitting in California provide insight into the following: (1) a
defendant's act with a purpose to aim or direct effects into the forum
state and (2) a defendant's act with a purpose that causes an effect
l 4
within the forum state.1
B.

Silverlit Toys Manufactory, Ltd., v. Absolute Toy Marketing, Inc.

In Silverlit Toys Manufactory, Ltd. v. Absolute Toy Marketing,
Inc.,"15 Silverlit, a California toymaker, copyrighted its design for a
miniature remote control helicopter called the "Picoo Z".1" Absolute
Toy Marketing, Inc. ("Absolute") was a toy retailer selling an alleged

180. Id. Third party activities were integral to the Court's decision in Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
181. Precision Craft, 2006 WL 538819, at *4.
182. Id. at *7. The court added that Cabin Kit, by selling Precision Craft's copyrighted
plans throughout the United States necessarily caused Precision Craft an injury in Idaho.
Id. Indeed, in the court's view, "Cabin Kit's alleged intentional actions were expressly
aimed or directed at [Idaho] and caused harm which [Cabin Kit] knew would be suffered
in [Idaho] where Precision Craft had its principal place of business." Id.
183. Id. On a motion to dismiss, the court took Precision Craft's allegations as true.
Id.
184. Goldberg v. Cameron, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Silverlit Toys
Manufactory, Ltd. v. Absolute Toy Mktg., Inc., No. C06-7966CW, 2007 WL 521239 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 15, 2007).
185. No. C06-7966CW, 2007 WL 521239 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2007).
186. Id. at *1.
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exact copy of the Picoo Z. 87 When Absolute failed to answer Silverlit's

cease-and-desist letters, Silverlit brought suit in California claiming
copyright infringement. Absolute met that claim and Silverlit's motion
for a preliminary injunction with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction."
When addressing the motion, the district court recognized that in
order for its jurisdictional exercise over Absolute to satisfy due process,
Absolute must have acted with a purpose to avail itself of California's
benefits, or it must have directed an act toward or executed a transaction within California or with a California resident. 89 Under this
approach, Absolute's sale of copies of Silverlit's copyrighted Picoo Z
subjected it to jurisdiction in California."9 ° In this regard, through its
California sales, Absolute was acting within and so availing itself of the
It was also causing in-state effects, namely
forum state's benefits.'
the harm to Silverlit, with each purchase of an infringing copy in
California.' 92

187. Id. at *2. Sales were made through Absolute's website. Id. For the discussion
of purposeful availment and the Internet, see infra notes 204-34 and accompanying text.
188. Silverlit, 2007 WL 521239, at *2.
189. Id. at *4. According to the court, acting with a purpose to avail is proven when
(1) a nonresident defendant executed or performed a contract in California or (2) when a
defendant acted with a purpose to direct those acts toward California. Id. For example,
if a nonresident defendant distributes materials in California that originated elsewhere or
knowingly causes harm in California through its act intentionally aimed at the state, the
defendant purposefully avails itself of that state. Id.
The court in Goldberg also confirmed that the purposeful availment, direction, or effects
analyses are essential to deciding whether the exercise ofjurisdiction is constitutional. 482
F. Supp. 2d at 1144. Each, however, is a part of the due process inquiry only. A federal
court must also consider whether the plaintiffs claim arises out of the defendant's "forum
acts" as well as whether the jurisdictional exercise is reasonable. Silverlit, 2007 WL
521239, at *4 (citing Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)).
190. Silverlit, 2007 WL 521239, at *4.
191. Id.
192. Id. Absolute conceded personal jurisdiction. That defendant, however, contested
jurisdiction with respect to two employees. The first was a manager with the capacity to
control sales. Id. at *8. The court concluded that the manager was subject to jurisdiction
in California as a "'moving, active conscious force behind the infringing activity.'" Id.
(quoting Babbit Elecs., Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 828 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Fla. 1993), affd 38
F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 1994)).
The second employee was Absolute's president. He also was found subject to jurisdiction
in California because he knowingly made misleading statements concerning the sale of
infringing copies of Silverlit's toy helicopter. Id. at *9. According to the district court, once
Absolute's president made the statements, he "was a moving active force behind the alleged
infringement." Id.
It is noteworthy that the court focused on the defendants' acts or activities and the
connections between them and the forum state when deciding that both of the individual
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C. Goldberg v. Cameron
In Goldberg v. Cameron,'93 the plaintiff, a copyright owner of a
movie script, sued the defendant, Cameron, and others in California for
infringement of the plaintiff's copyright on the movie trilogy that began
9 4 The defendant made a motion
with The Terminator.'
to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint, which gave rise to the district court's personal
jurisdiction analysis.' 95
The court in Goldberg began its consideration of the jurisdictional
issue by reviewing the purposeful availment, purposeful direction, and
purposeful effects concepts. 9 6 The court's position on purposeful
availment was important.' 97 In this regard, the court stated that the
"test was satisfied by the fact that the defendant had willfully infringed
copyrights owned by the plaintiff, which, as the defendant knew, had its
principal place of business in the forum district." 9 '
When the district court applied the purposeful availment test, it found
for the plaintiff for two reasons. First, Goldberg "made a prima facie
showing" that Cameron and the other defendants willfully infringed
Goldberg's copyright. 9' Second, the defendants acted with the intent
to produce movies for worldwide distribution, including, therefore, all
federal districts within the forum state, California. °0 As a result, the
defendants knew that their actions had an effect in California.2 °' They

defendants were subject to jurisdiction in California. At bottom, therefore, the analysis is
akin to acting with a purpose to avail, a purpose to direct, or a purpose to cause effects
within the forum state.
193. 482 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
194. Id. at 1141; THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale Film Corp. 1984).
195. Goldberg, 482 F. Supp. at 1142. It should be noted that the defendant contested
venue versus personal jurisdiction. Id. The venue statute in copyright cases states that
"'[clivil actions, suits, or proceedings arising under any Act of Congress relating to
copyrights... may be instituted in the district in which the defendant or his agent resides
or may be found.'" Id. at 1143 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2000)) (brackets in original).
According to the court in Goldberg, that statute has been construed within the Ninth
Circuit to equate venue with personal jurisdiction. Id. If, therefore, the defendant is
subject to personal jurisdiction before a district court sitting within a given state, venue
is proper before that court as well. Id.
196. Id. at 1143-44.
197. Id. at 1144.
198. Id. at 1144-45 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 1145.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1146.
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also knew of the adverse effects on the value of the plaintiff's copyright
0 2
within the federal district in which the plaintiff sued the defendants.
The review of Precision Craft, Silverlit, and Goldberg reveals a
constitutionally sound jurisdictional approach. Its contours are marked
by the following questions for copyright infringement litigants and
federal courts to consider: (1) did the alleged infringer act purposefully
or willfully within the forum state; (2) did he or she act purposefully or
willfully with the aim or direction of causing an effect in a forum state;
and (3) did he or she act knowing that she was causing the copyright
owner adverse effects in the forum state? Affirmative answers to one or
more of these questions prima facie proves the jurisdictional exercise
complies with due process. A negative response to these questions
requires a dismissal on lack of personal jurisdiction grounds.
The Ninth Circuit caselaw sharpened the edge of the purposeful
availment, direction, and effects tests for non-Internet copyright
infringement claims.2 °3 Copyright infringement via the Internet, as
well as the application of the appropriate tests, are the subject matter
of the next part of this Article.

202. Id. Ultimately, the court denied the defendants' improper venue (personal
jurisdiction) motion. Id.
203. Additional district court decisions within the Ninth Circuit further explore this
issue. See Goodwin v. Best Plan, Int'l, Ltd., No. C-04-2219EDL, 2004 WL 1924147 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 30, 2004) (holding that customers purchasing allegedly infringing copies of
copyrighted material within the forum state district may be sufficient to demonstrate that
the defendant purposefully availed itself of that forum district); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that a
website with a significant number of forum state users alleged to be copyright infringers
purposefully availed itself of the forum state); Overton v. Vanzant, No. CV 01-624-AS, 2001
WL 1911359 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2001) (holding that an alleged copyright infringer did not
purposefully avail herself of the forum state's benefits when appearing on a national
television talk show program); AdVideo, Inc. v. Kimel Broad. Group, Inc., 727 F. Supp.
1337 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that contract negotiations, execution, and "choice of forum"
provisions all concerning copyrighted materials were sufficient to show the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the forum state's benefits); Microsoft Corp. v. Very
Competitive Computer Prods. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 1250, 1255 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that
companies deliberately directing allegedly infringing computer programs into the forum
state purposefully availed themselves of the state's benefits and protections); Holder Corp.
v. Main St. Distrib., Inc., No. CIV 86-1285 PHX RCB, 1987 WL 14340 (D. Ariz. Apr. 21,
1987) (holding that shipping allegedly infringing copies into the forum state manifested
deliberate acts by which the defendant purposefully availed itself of that state).
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V.
SPECIAL CASE TWO: PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT, PURPOSEFUL
DIRECTION, OR PURPOSEFUL EFFECTS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS
CONCERNING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT VIA THE INTERNET

A number of lower federal courts have applied the purposeful
availment requirement to the personal jurisdiction issue in copyright
infringement claims arising from Internet activities. Alleged infringement via the Internet, however, has posed personal jurisdiction problems
unique to that communications medium. The decision in Mink v. AAAA
Development LLC °4 exemplifies the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit's solution to those problems.
A.

Mink v. AAAA Development LLC
In Mink v. AAAA Development LLC,2 °5 the plaintiff, a Texas resident, was the author of a computer program that the plaintiff claimed
the defendants conspired to copy. The plaintiff brought a copyright
infringement action before a federal district court in Texas against the
defendants, who were nonresidents of that state." 6 Following a
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff asked the court
to reconsider its decision on the basis that one of the defendants, AAAA,
maintained a "World Wide Website" that was "accessible by Texas
residents." °7
When it addressed the jurisdictional issue on appeal, the Fifth Circuit
recognized that the purposeful availment test must be satisfied in order
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to comport with due process.20 8
Although unclear from the opinion, it appears that deciding whether a
nonresident purposefully availed itself of the forum state's benefits
through its website turns on the character of that website. If the
website was passive, then the defendant has not acted with a purpose
to avail.20 9 According to the court in Mink, indicia of passivity includ-

204. 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
205. 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
206. Id. at 334-35.
207. Id. at 335-36. Whether the district court had jurisdiction on the basis of a website
accessible by forum state residents was an issue of first impression within the Fifth
Circuit. Id. at 336.
208. Id. at 336. The Supreme Court's "minimum contacts" approach fromInternational
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), requires as much. For the discussion of the
Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), see supra notes 27-32
and accompanying text.
209. Mink, 190 F.3d at 336. According to the court, when passive, the website is
nothing more than an advertisement on the Internet. Id.
It, therefore, lacks the
requirement that the defendant's act is directed at or done with the aim of reaching forum
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ed merely posting information, providing printable mail-in forms, and
providing a toll-free phone number, mailing address, or email address.2 1 °
Distinguishable from a passive website-one in which the copyrightinfringing defendant had not acted with a purpose to avail itself of the
forum state-is an interactive website.2 1' With interactivity comes an
exchange of information between the nonresident defendant who
maintains the website and the forum state residents.212 The most
important aspect of such an exchange, for jurisdictional purposes, is the
forum state resident's ability to buy the defendant's goods or services
"on-line. 2 13
When the Fifth Circuit reviewed the AAAA website, it concluded that
the website was passive, not interactive.2 14 Indeed, "potential customers [were] instructed by the website to remit any completed order forms
by regular mail or fax."21
The distinction that the court in Mink drew when deciding the
jurisdictional questions of passive versus interactive websites was the
foundation on which a number of district courts similarly built their
analyses in copyright infringement cases. In this regard, the opinions
21 6
in Images of the World, Inc. v. ContinentalAmerican Industries, Inc.
2
7
1
and Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fysh are instructive.

state residents. Id.
210. Id. at 337. The court suggested that a website is not passive if customers may
place orders for goods or services through it. Id.
211. Id. at 336. Interactivity, as a basis for a constitutionally firm jurisdictional
exercise, was first proposed in a noncopyright case, but one nonetheless worth reading.
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). The court
in Mink expressly adopted the Zippo reasoning. Mink, 190 F.3d at 336.
212. Mink, 190 F.3d at 336.
213. Id. Although unstated by the court in Mink, it appears that a nonresident
defendant who maintains such a website is directing its commercial activities to forum
state residents. To the extent that those residents could buy "on-line," the defendant also
is acting deliberately to cause effects within the forum state. Purposeful direction or
purposeful effects amply support the conclusion that the defendant acted with a purpose
to avail itself of the forum state or may stand alone to support the constitutionality of a
jurisdictional exercise.
214. Id.
215. Id. As a consequence, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Mink's claim
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
216. No. 04 C 7002, 2005 WL 2171193 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2005).
217. No. 5:06-CV-37, 2007 WL 541988 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2007).
218. These are just samples of relevant caselaw. Many other examples exist. See
Action Tapes, Inc. v. Weaver, No. Civ. 3:05-CV-1693-H, 2005 WL 3199706 (N.D. Tex. Nov.
23, 2005) (holding that a copyright infringing transaction via the eBay website is not a
purposeful act demonstrating the purposeful availment needed for jurisdiction); Global 360,
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B. Images of the World, Inc. v. Continental American Industries, Inc.
In Images of the World, Inc. v. Continental American Industries,
Inc.,219 the plaintiff was the copyright owner of four motion picture
films that the defendants were selling over the Internet. Following the
defendants' failure to cease and desist the use of the copyrighted movies,
the plaintiff brought an infringement action. In response, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.2 2 °
When addressing that motion, a federal district court sitting in Illinois
focused on "[tihe types of contacts that constitute fair warning" to the
defendants-"those that are purposefully directed to the forum state to
establish minimum contacts."22 ' In examining the contacts, the court
in Images applied the following three-step analysis that emphasized the
interactivity of Continental's website: (1) doing Internet business with
forum state residents, (2) using its website to exchange information with

Inc. v. Spittin' Image Software, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-1857, 2005 WL 2179130 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 9, 2005) (discussing copyright infringement over a nonresident's website,
telephone, and email sales and service causing effects in the forum state); Brayton Purcell
LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that willful
copyright infringement plus a passive website was sufficient to establish purposeful
direction under the "effects" test); Dakcoll, Inc. v. Grand Cent. Graphics, Inc., 352 F. Supp.
2d 990 (D.N.D. 2005) (holding that soliciting buyers of infringing copies online, allowing
prospective buyers to browse copyrighted designs online, and allowing online buying of
allegedly infringing copyrighted materials is sufficiently interactive-purposefully
availing-to support jurisdictional exercise); LCW Auto. Corp. v. Restivo Enters., No. SA04-CA-0361-XR, 2004 WL 2203440 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2004) (holding that the defendant's
website was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction when it was only an advertisement, even if that advertisement contained a toll-free telephone number and email
address); Metro-Goldwyn-MayerStudios Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (holding that the owner
of a website that permitted file-sharing among a significant number of forum-state users
had purposefully availed itself of the forum's benefits); Winfield Collection, Ltd. v.
McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that under the purposeful
availment prong of the jurisdictional analysis, maintaining an interactive website without
more does not establish minimum contacts over the website's sponsor); Costar Group, Inc.
v. Loopnet, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 780 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that website postings that
could be viewed by forum state residents were insufficient to establish an intention, or
purpose, to harm interests of copyright owners under the "effects" test of purposeful
direction).
219. No. 04 C 7002, 2005 WL 2171193 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2005).
220. Id. at *1-2.
221. Id. at *3. The court in Images added: "'[i]f a defendant has purposefully
established minimum contacts with the forum [s]tate, the nature of the contacts are
considered to determine whether assertion of'jurisdiction would comport with fair play and
substantial justice.'" Id. (first brackets in original) (quoting Int'l Star Registry of Ill. v.
Bowman-Haight Ventures, Inc., No. 98 C 6823, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7009, at *10 (N.D.
Ill. May 4, 1999)).
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potential customers, and (3) maintaining a website devoid of communication between the defendants and users.222
Next, the court in Images focused on the application of the analysis. 223 Doing so led the court to a number of findings. 224

The most

important of these was that the defendants profited when forum state
residents purchased the alleged infringing movies through the defendants' website.225 According to the court in Images, "[t]hat benefit
confirms that [the d]efendants purposefully directed its [sic] business
activities to the State of Illinois."226
Like the district court in Images, other courts have also found that a
copyright infringer demonstrated purposeful availment when it profited
from purchases made by forum state residents on its website. A similar
227
result was reached in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fysh.

C.

Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fysh
In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.v. Fysh, 228 the defendant

allegedly infringed the plaintiff's copyright on movies and television
programs through the defendant's website that enabled "users to
download indexed hash files which corresponded to [the] copyrighted

222. Id. This analysis was first adopted in Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. According to
the court in Zippo, "[Tihe likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an
entity conducts over the Internet." Id. The decision in Zippo and its 'sliding scale"
analysis may be deficient. Lora M. Jennings, Finding Legal Certainty for E-Commerce:
TraditionalPersonal JurisdictionAnalysis and the Scope of the Zippo Sliding Scale, 44
WASHBURN L.J. 381, 381-411 (2005) (concluding that contacts with the forum state,
resulting from a website, should be considered in addition to the website's passivity or
interactivity).
223. Images, 205 WL 2171193, at *4-5.
224. Id. at *4-9.
225. Id. at *4.Additional findings included the following: (1) the operation of a website
that enabled customers to browse the defendant's catalog and to place Internet orders; (2)
a business that neither targeted nor tailored the online enterprise to a particular
geographic area; and (3) forum state customers who were allowed to buy the allegedly
infringing films. Id.
226. Id. (emphasis added). That the defendants acted purposefully toward Illinois, the
forum state, was manifested by their "repeated and conscious choice to process orders" of
forum residents, as well as the defendants' knowledge that they would fill those orders by
forwarding the allegedly infringing films into the forum state. Id. In addition, the quality
of the defendants' acts purposefully directed toward the forum state (repetitive, conscious,
and knowing) supported the jurisdictional exercise, even though the number of acts was
small. Id. Finally, the court in Images subscribed to the proposition that a single forum
contact can justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id.
227. No. 5:06-CV-37, 2007 WL 541988 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2007).
228. No. 5:06-CV-37, 2007 WL 541988 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2007).
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movies or television programs. " "'
When Fysh failed to respond to
Columbia's complaint, he was subject to a default judgment, but only if
the district court had personal jurisdiction over him.23 °
After the court considered the jurisdictional issue, it concluded that
the defendant's website may have "constitute[d] the purposeful
availment of the privilege of acting in a forum state... 'if the website
[was] interactive to a degree that reveal[ed] specifically intended
interaction with the residents of the state.' 231 When it examined the
degree to which the defendant's website was interactive, the court
considered: (1) the profit made from the website's operation, (2) the
users' ability to download files of the allegedly infringing materials, (3)
the users' ability to post their own files on the website, (4) the users'
ability to acquire log-in names, (5) the defendant's server's location in
the forum state, and (6) the number of forum state residents downloading the copyrighted movies and television programs.3 2 Upon
considering the degree of interactivity, the court in Fysh held "it [was]
clear [the defendant] specifically intended interaction with Michigan
residents."23 3 As a consequence, the court had jurisdiction over the
defendant.23 4
After examining the Images and Fysh analyses of purposeful
availment, direction, and effects in copyright infringement via the
Internet cases, it is clear that the degree of interactivity between the
defendant's website and forum state residents is determinative of the
jurisdiction exercise. Because matters of degree make up the bulk of
this analysis, judicial decision-making in this area will inevitably be ad
hoc.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTARY

A number of federal courts have applied the purposeful availment,
direction, or effects tests of minimum contacts to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction within copyright infringement cases. In doing so, the courts

229. Id. at *2.
230. Id. at *1.
231. Id. at *2 (quoting Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir. 2002)).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. The holding in this regard is overly broad. Earlier in the opinion, the court
acknowledged that it was employing a three-prong jurisdictional test. Id. The first prong
of that test concerns interactivity, namely, purposeful availment. Id. The other two prongs
remain to be explored: (1) the copyright infringement arising from the defendant's website
operation and (2) the reasonableness of the jurisdictional exercise. Id. The opinion,
however, examined neither prong. Id. It appears, however, that the district court may
have thought both favored the copyright owner.
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followed the line of United States Supreme Court decisions beginning
with Hanson v. Denckla235 and ending with Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court.2 36
In Asahi four Justices adopted a stream-of-commerce-plus premise to
determine if the exercise of personal jurisdiction complied with due
process, while four other Justices adopted a stream-of-commerce
premise.2 37 As a consequence, lower federal courts in copyright
litigation must choose which premise to follow.23 This choice may
affect the outcome of the purposeful availment test's application. The
Sixth Circuit's decision in BridgeportMusic v. Still N the Water Publishing23" and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Luv N' Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix,
Inc. 240 illustrates the outcome-determinative nature of a federal court's
choice of premise.24 1
In Bridgeport Music, the court of appeals adopted the stream-ofcommerce-plus premise.242 The court, therefore, considered the acts of
the defendants, NTW and DM, looking for each defendant's purpose to
avail or the "plus" within the stream of commerce.24 With respect to
NTW, the court held that engaging in national licensing, advertising,
and marketing, and affiliating with two national performance rights
societies did not satisfy the purposeful availment or the stream-ofcommerce-plus tests.2 44 Unlike NTW, however, DM targeted the forum
state for distribution of allegedly infringing copies of Bridgeport's music.
DM did so by obligating its record distributor to disseminate the copies
within the forum state. This demand that a distributor supply copies
within the forum state made the act one with a purpose to avail, and it

235.

357 U.S. 235 (1958).

236. 480 U.S. 102 (1987); see also supra notes 27-78 and accompanying text. As a
reminder, neither the courts of appeals nor the district courts distinguish between the
Fourteenth Amendment due process limits and the Fifth Amendment due process limits.
Rather, lower federal courts simply apply, without explanation, the United States Supreme

Court's Fourteenth Amendment analysis in the federal-question-copyright case to the issue
of personal jurisdiction within due process limits.

237. 357 U.S. at 108-13, 116-18.
238. Supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text (analyzing the opinions of Justices
O'Connor and Brennan setting out the opposing premises).
239. 327 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
240. 438 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2006).
241. Supra notes 81-130 and accompanying text.
242. 327 F.3d at 479-80; supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.

243. BridgeportMusic, 327 F.3d at 478-79; supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
244. BridgeportMusic, 327 F.3d at 479-83; supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
NTW's website also did not provide the purpose or "plus." Supra note 113.
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satisfied the stream-of-commerce-plus requirement for the proper
exercise of personal jurisdiction.24
In Luv N' Care, the Fifth Circuit judicial panel adopted a stream-ofcommerce premise to establish minimum contacts.246 With commerce
as its focus, the court, in effect, concluded that if Insta-Mix foresaw or
was aware of marketing infringing copies in the forum state, it
purposefully availed itself of that state's benefits.2 47 The court's
examination of Insta-Mix's acts, therefore, was directed to foreseeability
or awareness. 24 8 Given the defendant's awareness of marketing
infringing copies in the forum state and the revenues derived from that
activity, the court held the defendant met the purposeful availment
requirement.2 49
For the court in Luv N' Care,foreseeability of forum state contacts was
sufficient to satisfy the purposeful availment test. Bridgeport Music,
however, is qualitatively different from Luv N' Care. In Bridgeport
Music, the Sixth Circuit identified purposeful availment only when a
defendant acted deliberately to obligate its record distributor to sell
infringing copies within the forum state.26 0
In addition to the different results under the purposeful availment test
of minimum contacts, given the different premises, it is important for
litigants and federal courts to consider the breadth of that test. In this
regard, federal courts distinguish among circumstances manifesting
purposeful availment, direction, or effects.2" 1
The decision of the district court in KnowledgeAZ, Inc. v. Jim Walter
Resources, Inc. 252 exemplifies

purposeful

availment.

There, the

defendant, JWR, deliberately entered into a continuing relationship with

245. BridgeportMusic, 327 F.3d at 483-85; supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
DM's website also provided that purpose or plus. Supra note 113.
246. 438 F.3d at 469-70; supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
247. Luv N' Care, 438 F.3d at 469-70; supra note 122 and accompanying text
(discussing the holdings of the court of appeals).
248. Luv N' Care, 438 F.3d at 469-70.
249. Id. at 471-72; supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings
and conclusions of the court). It is curious at the very least that Insta-Mix, through its
distribution contract, purposefully acted to preclude the jurisdictional exercise. The
contract failed to do so. Luv N' Care, 438 F.3d at 475-76; supra note 122 and accompanying text.
250. 327 F.3d at 480; supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. Judge DeMoss's
specially concurring opinion in Luv N Care also distinguished between purposeful
availment under the stream-of-commerce-plus premise versus the commerce alone premise
to establish minimum contacts. 438 F.3d at 474-76 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring);
supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
251. Supra notes 132-63 and accompanying text.
252. 452 F. Supp. 2d 882 (2006).
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the plaintiff, a forum state resident. That relationship resulted in the
purposeful availment necessary for the court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.253
The decision in Barrow Industries, Inc. v. JST America, Inc.254 aids
in isolating the analysis of purposeful direction. Purposeful direction is
manifested when a nonresident defendant deliberately targets infringing
copies of copyrighted materials toward forum state residents.255 The
defendant, however, has not intentionally targeted these copies if
advertising is the only forum contact; consequently, the result is a lack
256
of purposeful direction, and thus a lack of jurisdiction.
25
7
Finally, the court in Goldberg v. Cameron applied the purposeful
effects test of minimum contacts. 5 5 In doing so, the two main factors
upon which the court's opinion focuses are especially notable: (1) the
nonresident defendant's deliberate attempt to distribute the allegedly
infringing movie within the forum state; and (2) the nonresident
defendant's actual distribution of the film in that state.259 The purposeful effects test of minimum contacts, therefore, contemplates not
only a copyright infringer who caused effects within the forum state but
also one who had the intention to do so.
To date, federal courts most often apply the purposeful availment,
direction, or effects tests of minimum contacts to copyright infringement
litigation in the non-Internet context. There is, however, a growing body
of Internet caselaw in which these tests are applied.2 6 ° That caselaw

253. Id. at 887, 896. The district court made a point of examining the entirety of the
transaction between the nonresident defendant and the forum state resident, the plaintiff,
including negotiations, consequences, terms, and actual course of dealing before finding:
(1) that JWR acted deliberately and (2) that there was a continuing relationship. Id. at
895-99; supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
254. No. 01-11619, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7490 (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2002).
255. Id. at *21-23; supra note 149 and accompanying text.
256. Barrow Indus., 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7490, at *22-24; supra note 149 and
accompanying text. It is also noteworthy that the nonresident defendant may target forum
state consumers for the infringing copies, but the consumers need not buy those copies.
If, in addition to targeting the forum state, the defendant hits that mark by selling
infringing copies there, the copyright owner can establish purposeful availment as well as
direction. Therefore, the two tests of minimum contacts are not mutually exclusive.
257. 482 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
258. Id. at 1144-46; supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text. The decisions in
PrecisionCraft Log Structures,Inc. v. CabinKit Co., No. CV05-199-S-EJL, 2006 WL 538819
(D. Idaho Mar. 3, 2006), and Silverlit Toys Manufactory, Ltd. v. Absolute Toy Marketing,

Inc., No. C 06-7966 CW, 2007 WL 521239 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2007), by district courts
within the Ninth Circuit also applied an effects test. Supra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
259. Goldberg, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1145-46; supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
260. Supra notes 204-34 and accompanying text.
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indicates the tests are generally applicable to copyright infringement
actions. 61 Whether one of the tests is met turns on the nature of the
defendant's website. If the website is passive, the defendant has not
purposefully availed itself of the forum state's benefits, nor has it
directed activities toward that state or caused any effect there." 2 If
the website is interactive, however, one or more of the minimumcontacts-purpose-based tests may be met.2"3 The lack of a clear line
between the passive versus interactive dichotomy is problematic. In fact,
the decisional law suggests that a sliding scale is used to decide when
a defendant's site moves from passive to interactive, which provides little
guidance to district courts facing this issue.2"
In conclusion, the purposeful availment, purposeful direction, and
purposeful effects tests of personal jurisdiction due process limits are
firmly rooted in copyright litigation. Under a stream-of-commerce-plus
premise, the tests ensure that the defendant acted with the intent to
avail itself of the forum state, aim its acts explicitly at that state, or
cause forum state consequences. When the defendant's intentions
circumscribe a copyright owner's suit within a given forum, the action
in that state is predictable and certain. As such, the defendant
understandably may be "haled into court" there.
A copyright infringement action within a given state is neither
predictable nor certain, however, when a federal court accepts the use
of the stream-of-commerce premise to establish minimum contacts. In
this regard, foreseeability is the hallmark of the premise. Infringing
copies that are foreseen to enter a given state may include those
randomly present or those present as a result of the activities of others
than the defendant.
Given the opposing results of competing minimum contacts premises,
it is submitted that the defendants to copyright litigation must be
afforded predictable and certain due process protection. As such, federal
courts should apply the purposeful availment, purposeful direction, and
purposeful effects tests. Only then can federal courts avoid jurisdictional
exercises in copyright litigation that may arise from random acts,
happenstance, or acts other than the defendant's.

261.
262.
263.
264.

Supra notes 204-34
Supra note 215 and
Supra notes 222-26
Supra note 222 and

and accompanying text.
accompanying text.
and accompanying text (discussing the opinion in Images).
accompanying text.

